Bill's Comments

My lack of posting is due to a very strenuous work schedule. I am currently commuting weekly across country. My standard work week, counting travel, is over 60 hours. At the same time I am preparing a play to be produced at our church in October. What time is left is spent catching up on things that have to be done at home. I am not even able to keep up with my favorite blogs, much less produce material for this one. This will continue until almost the end of the year. Once the play is done, I may be able to post more. Please stop by once in a while to see if anything new has been put up. I will try to get something up occasionally. Now I have to go get on a plane.

Praying for Peace
Every Sunday part of the general prayers is a prayer for peace in the world and a cessation of war. This is a desirable state of affairs, but coupled with the prayer seems to be an attitude that simply stopping the fighting is a solution and that it will create peace.

I have a sense that most mainline protestant religions have been hijacked by a pacifistic attitude, that simply not fighting is a good in itself. They have gotten the wrong message from the gospel, elevating turning the other cheek to abject surrender, and sweeping Jesus cleansing the temple and saying he came to split brother from brother, etc., under the rug. In effect, what should be the bastion of unbending morality and rectitude, the church, has become a resting place for moral equivalencing and a sloppy "We are all brothers" [despite the fact that my "brother" will behead me or put me in servitude.]

What we should be praying for is VICTORY. A total conquest over the forces of Islamic Jihad. Praying for peace is a way of avoiding making the very moral judgments that are required, because the shape of the peace being prayed for is never explicitly defined, as if it were self-evident. If the world is saved from Islamic Jihad, it will be the fundamentalists and the Baptists who will do the job. Despite my various disagreements with their version of Christianity, they have one great strength--they make moral judgments unapologetically, and that is what is sorely needed here.

Let's see, N. Korea fired missiles, Hezbolla kidnapped Israeli soldiers, and Iran is thumbing their nose at the world. A mistake that bullies make all the time is to think their victims will remain victims. All but the most timid of victims eventually says, "ENOUGH!" and strikes back. Al Qaida finally pushed too far with 9/11, and Hezbolla did it with Israel. What the bullies don't understand, is that their victims are smarter than they are. When they strike back it is far more effective. Even Japan, the Pacifist of the Pacific, is talking about a pre-emptive strike on N. Korea.

It's going to get very ugly, but the bad guys are finally appearing as such bad guys that most people aren't buying it any more. When USA Today shows a picture of a Palestinian or Lebanese woman celebrating the capture of an Israeli soldier by brandishing a pair of handguns, the message is loud and clear. I consider USA Today one of the bulwarks of the MSM, and even they let a pro-Israeli, anti-Arab picture be published. This time Palestine has lost the publicity battle.

It took 40 years, instead of 20, this time for the Arabs to forget that Israel has always been superior in their military skill. I expect Israel to whip some serious butt. And Allah help Iran, (I don't think God will. No, they aren't the same I have decided.), if they try to use a nuke. Israel will do exactly as they say, turn all Arab capitals into glass or at least rubble. [And I do applaud Pres. Bush for stating that Israel had a right to defend herself. For the most part he has the right idea in foreign policy; it's his domestic policy that I dislike.]

[OK, I can't resist. "The East... are our friends, Oceana is our enemy...Oceana is our friends, and East... has always been our enemy." "Palestine and Lebanon are unfairly targeted by Israel. Israel is defending herself." George Orwell was so prescient.]

...and they don't know it--yet.

I keep reading the same stories with variations on themes in USA Today and the web, and would get horribly upset if I let myself. I often ask, "How can people be so stupid? How can they fall for the obvious propaganda of the MSM, politicians, and other people?" I sometimes almost want to surrender to despair. But being a student of history, I remember that despite all the headlines, and the messes we have in the world, our own politics, and the press, it is important to remember....

...It has been this bad and worse in our history, and we have survived and gone on to better.

Religious Style
Saturday, at the men's breakfast, we got into a discussion of churches and what they provide. We were talking about the largest churches, 5-10,000 every Sunday, and noticed that the ones that were mentioned were all non-denominational, non-liturgical churches. One of us pointed out that a lot of these churches seem to focus on the non-believer, or the person just coming into the church, leaving those already there, to pretty much fend for themselves theologically. He termed them "Seeker Churches" as being oriented towards those seeking a church or some sort of religious affiliation.

My wife and I then had occasion to visit one of these churches the next day. Some friends were baptizing their children that day. There was essentially no liturgy. There was an opening hymn, the baptism, recognition of those who had completed a bible study course, a pastoral prayer (very informal at that), an anthem by the choir, a Gospel lesson (no other scripture was read, no OT, Epistle, or Psalm), the sermon, the collection, and the benediction. The sermon was not an exegesis on the gospel text and in fact had to stretch to relate to it. It was a recruiting speech, pure and simple. Overall, I had the feeling I was in a performance. The pastor was so cheerful and positive I almost thought he might have had his smile put in place permanently by a plastic surgeon (except once in a while it slipped). His voice modulation was the perfect evangelical minister accent.

The whole thing was to make people feel good. This is probably what is going on with religion today. The mainline Protestant groups are generally shrinking. The theology is too nuanced, and the liturgy too serious for today's people raised on TV and instant gratification. Keep it simple, be baptized, accept Jesus as your savior, and you are good to go. Don't worry about all that grace and works stuff. You have been saved--you're going to Heaven. Oh yeah, make sure you come every Sunday and put your money in the collection plate. It is the new version of indulgences, Born-Again-Christian style.

I have no problem with there being joy in religion, but when joy, here and now, becomes the end, there is something wrong.

Then there is the self-righteous special--follow this set of rules and you are holy. Pharisees in Christian drag. Ready to condemn at the drop of a swear word, whiskey, or pants. Not only that but so virtuous-feeling because they aren't like those who do such things. Since they are Biblical literalists almost exclusively, I wonder how they deal with Jesus and wine, or for that matter, his forgiveness of sinners. The whole concept of Grace disappears. There are members of my family in this group, that don't believe my son is in Heaven, because he wasn't baptized by full-emersion.

Baptism
Having brought this topic up in the preceding paragraphs, I thought I should make a short note on how I view baptism. The two most common views of baptism are that it is either a rebirth (rising from water) or a washing away of sin. For that matter it could be a combination of both.

I don't see it as either one. Being symbolically oriented, I see it as a public statement of commitment to Christian ideals. Parents make the commitment for their children (just as they do for other things that must be decided for their good before they have the capacity to decide), and God Parents take on the responsibility to see it through. Baptism is an important first step in religious belief. It is a ritual that publically states ones willingness to be part of the Christian community. For children, First Communion is next and finally Confirmation (the Christian analog of Bar or Baht Mitzvah). For adults, at least in the ELCA, once one is baptized, one can commune, and after brief training in Lutheran belief, one can become a member. This latter is an important formality. It is the recognition that one is now a member of the family.

Evangelism
The scripture at men's breakfast yesterday was the story of Ezekiel's becoming a prophet. Each prophet has a different story, and each is specific to the prophet's nature. What most people don't realize is that to one degree or another, we are all prophets. Prophets were not primarily prognosticators. They were, and are, truth-tellers. The more prominent (or notorious, as you chose) did indeed prognosticate and often it was gloomy. Sometimes the truth was condemnatory, hence the creation of the word, Jeremiad, a doom-saying condemnation of something.

How we are prophets is in how we live our lives. We live according to our vision of the truth, and it is our public lives that convinces people to believe or not believe what we say. If we live according to the religious beliefs we say we have, we provide an example of what that means and by our existence become evangelists. Typically evangelism behaviorly means bringing someone to church and convincing them to join. But what we forget is that in order to bring them to church, we have to make our lives vis-a-vis the church desirable.

To be an evangelist, we need to have a clear picture of our relationship to God and how we practice it. It is that practice that will provide our evangelism, not all the talking in the world.

Several weeks ago, Bill Vallicella posted a note called “A Problem for Functionalism” which prompted a fairly lengthy comment thread among Malcolm Pollack (Waka Waka Waka), Bob Koepp (no blog or website), and The Duece (Telic Thoughts). Since it dealt with the brain and the philosophy of mind, I was quite interested. However, I was unable to enter the discussion in real-time. Here is my much-delayed contribution to the discussion.

Here is the starting point, taken from Bill’s original post:

Even if every mental state is a brain state, it is quite clear that not every brain state is a mental state: not everything going on in the brain manifests mentality. So what distinguishes the brain states that are mental states from the brain states that are not? This question cannot be evaded. ….[neurophysiology is not] the sort of talk that makes intelligible why a particular complex state of Jones' brain is his intense elation at getting his neuroscience text accepted for publication.

One answer is the functionalist theory that causal role is what makes a brain state a mental state. What makes a mental state mental is just the causal role it plays in mediating between sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and other internal states of the subject whose state it is. The idea is not the banality that mental events have causes and effects, but that it is causal role occupancy, nothing more and nothing less, that constitutes the mentality of a mental state. The intrinsic nature of what plays the role is relevant only to its fitness for instantiating mental causal roles but not at all relevant to its being a mental state.

I stress that physical composition is irrelevant. Anything that does the job of a valve-lifter is a valve-lifter. The function is 'multiply realizable' as we say in the trade. … Another important point is that a particular thing that functions as a valve-lifter can assume other functions, that of paper-weight for example.

Can we apply this functionalist model to the mind?

The Deuce provided additional clarification:

[T]he philosophy of mind position generally known as "functionalism" is an attempt to reduce the intentional to the causal, and hence it uses a notion of "function" that includes only what a thing does, rather than what it was intended to do.

Having stated the overall problem and question, let us begin the discussion.

“Even though every valve-lifter is an engine part, it is quite clear that not every engine part is a valve-lifter. So what distinguishes the engine parts that are valve-lifters from the parts that are not?”

Valve-lifter provides the connection between a cam and the push-rod. A valve-lifter as a valve-lifter has some environmental requirements and some compositional requirements. However, the requirements cannot be used to explain the lifter. Since the lifter rides upon a cam and thrusts against the push rod, it must be durable to friction, though oil helps, and it must be incompressible. For a particular engine there might be shape requirements, e.g. round, pocket at one end for the push rod, etc., though the later could be a point that sits in a socket on the push rod. But if I handed you a hunk of metal that was in actuality a valve-lifter and you had no prior knowledge of valve-lifters, there would be nothing in its composition to tell you what it was. You might well use it as a paper weight, a counter-weight on some lever, or even a door-stop, or as a drift (a piece of metal that is set against something in a hole and is pounded on to drive the object out of the hole, similar to a punch).

I have often done reverse-engineering, which is a related process to looking at a hunk of metal and trying to determine what it is for. It is essential to success at this process to have some prior knowledge of the purpose or possible purposes. However, as I am writing, I am looking at the reverse engineering process, and I realize that certain properties imply certain abilities. Can we use intersecting properties to define the function? Even so, another set might do the same which then says the properties intrinsic don’t define or explain the function.

The valve-lifter is one, solely by virtue of what it does. If it were inherent in its composition, we would be able to see what it does from what it is. The valve-lifter’s composition is dictated by the function, not the function dictated by the composition. From this, it is fairly easy to see that functionalism is good at describing material objects and their relationships and purpose.

But there is some validity to constraining the valve lifter by its composition. Bill makes the claim that composition is irrelevant. However, he also states that the composition is irrelevant to the explanation, not to the action when it occurs.

“Similarly, I don't know what makes a certain heavy object under my hood a battery just in virtue of knowing all the electrochemistry involved in its operation.”

But this is part of a battery as such! Bill is taking certain definitions, then asking why something does or does not fit. In this particular case he is confusing the definition of battery with DC power source, of which battery is a subset. This does not invalidate that he is looking at function totally isolated from the material doing the function. The battery is a source of DC voltage, but what distinguishes a battery from the two leads from a rectifier? The rectifier is not a battery, but it serves the same function (purpose). This is part of the problem, that function and purpose are intertwined (but must be separated). But this example does imply that the definition of the function may have a lot to do with its utility as a model.

“Another important point is that a particular thing that functions as a valve-lifter can assume other functions, that of paper-weight for example”

Functionalism separates ORIGINAL purpose, but purpose causes function—functionalism wants the function to create the purpose. This seems circular—a valve-lifter is functioning (being used as) as a paperweight. Therefore its purpose is to be a paperweight. (imposed vs. inherent purpose) We are in a question of inherent function vs. imposed function.

Does anything have inherent function? This is an important question—does anything by virtue of its existence and composition have a specific function? Or does the function dictate the composition? It at least constrains the composition. But the more specific the function, the more specific the constraints. However, the resultant product though optimized for its current function is not constrained to have only that function. Context is all important. A valve-lifter is a valve-lifter in an engine but a paper-weight on my desk.

But this focuses on other properties of the valve-lifter, its massiveness, its resistance to roll. But these are part of its composition. Because it is multiply-propertied it is multiply-functioned? Since all material things can have multiple properties, they would appear to have multiple functions.

At this point, functionalism looks very successful with explaining material objects, so let’s now return to our question, “Can we apply this functionalist model to the mind?”

That's the basic idea. What makes a brain state a desire is the causal role that state plays. There is nothing intrinsic to the brain state itself that could tell you that it was a desire for a beer rather than an intention to paint the bathroom, or a memory of a trip to the Grand Canyon.

It is at this point that Malcolm wanted to invoke mappings and Bob Koepp brought in intentionality. Bill’s reply brought into focus that functionalism deals only with roles. As such it is not a full description of an object or a state, ignoring what the physical aspects are. At his point I see the problem as trying to use a good explanation of material reality to explain an immaterial reality—mentality.

Here is one problem. It seems clear that my intention to clear brush could not have been a desire for a cold beer. Nor could it be an intention to paint the bathroom. The act of intending is individuated by its intentional content (to clear brush; to pain the bathroom): the content enters into the description of the act. This entails that the act could not have been an act having a different content.
But if it is causal role occupancy that makes brain state B an intention to clear brush, then B could have been an intention to paint the bathroom. Since this is absurd, it cannot be causal role occupancy that makes B an intention to clear brush.

The problem is that this violates the multiple function aspect of functionalism.
But if we create a correspondence between a physical state and a mental state, we haven’t explained the mental state, according to BV. In essence he is saying that we cannot explain the difference in two mental states by the differences in the physical states, at least in neuron-physiological terms. To restate his car engine analogy, he considers the physical state of the brain analogous to the materials of a valve-lifter, and what the valve lifter does as analogous to a mental state.

Here is a version of Koepp’s argument on brain states:
But is it more accurate to consider the mental state analogous to the output of the engine ? If that is the case then we move the problem further in but don’t solve it, in that the mental state is a composite of other functions, which it may be. Rather like a robot can do multiple tasks with the same pieces but different programs. So a mental state could be the combining of more fundamental mental activities in differing ways.

So Jones’ elation at the publication of his neuroscience text may be the result of the combination of a function that creates a feeling of satisfaction, one that creates joy, one that drives goal-directed behavior, one that analyzes context, one that sets criteria, and others. But even if we can further decompose these functions until we map them to neural processes, we haven’t explained in BV’s terms, because it then is the program or the linkages that must be explained. And the difficulty is that if we try to put the program into a physical state, then we have two problems, one, we then haven’t explained in terms of functionality, and two, if it is physical, it must be transitory or else we become locked into repetitive behavior on a large scale.

But is the original problem incorrectly formulated? Is it too specific? To return to our valve-lifter, are we asking, why is this a valve-lifter in a Chevy 350 and not in a Chrysler 400? Can functionalism be applied to such a specific question? Note that even though it is a valve-lifter in both cases, it cannot be the same valve-lifter. If we argue that being in a Chevy 350 is a different function than being in a Chrysler 400, then we should also allow intent to paint the bathroom is different from intent to drink a beer.

Bill states that the content of the function, its purpose is part of it. This supports idea that what we are calling mental states here are composites, and the aboutness comes from a combination. Again, have we applied the concept at the wrong level, and if so, have we simply moved the problem? If an intention is equivalent to the valve-lifter, and the intention to do a specific thing is equivalent to the engine the valve-lifter is in, have we simply moved the problem somewhere else?

If that is the case, can we discuss pure “intention” without an object? If so, does it relate to a certain area of the brain, and does the composition of the area explain why this is intention? Is the composition of the area such that it can only function as an intention-producer? If so, why?

Or is intention analogous to a specific metallic composition, and then we are faced with the problem of why intention plus something else is a particular intention and not some other, and this means that the something else must have a particular brain state that is explanatory.

OK, then are certain brain-states explanatory, or is it inherently impossible for a given brain state to be shown to be explanatory? If this is the case that no brain-state by itself is explanatory, then there has to be something outside the brain to create the total state that provides the end result.
Though it is possible to partition the brain into various layers and gross functions, the total state of the brain is very tricky. Some parts are very persistent and others are extremely transient. When we talk about a mental state, what are we talking about? Bill is correct in that from a functionalist standpoint clearing the brush and drinking a beer may have the same state, but can’t. So I am back to: it is at the wrong level.

But am I assuming the nature of the stuff to explain? Or am I trying to say it requires the nature of the stuff to explain? But Bill says that one cannot use the nature of the stuff to explain, at least in functionalist terms.

What does it mean to explain a valve-lifter without referring to its composition and shape? And in what context is this explanation meaningful? In order to function in an engine it must have a certain composition and shape To function as a paper weight is less restrictive. All it has to have is mass. To function as a valve-lifter in any context will require constraints on its shape and composition.

The function creates the constraints. The function does not necessarily follow from the constraints. But is functionalism then empty? One creates the function, then allows anything that will fill that function. What is being taken as mental states are apparently highly specific in effect. But a specific mental state would not fill any causal role other than the particular one.

Functionalism is trying to dissociate the physical makeup from its function, that its function is something independent of the makeup. It is an approach from roles and relationships not the properties of objects. In one sense this seems correct to do this, e.g., the paper weight example, where anything with mass will work. But when it comes to brain states, it doesn’t appear to work, because the role seems to require a specific state, e.g. the intention to drink a beer vs. the intention to clear brush.

Functionalism breaks down here. It is saying that anything that functions as the intention to drink a beer is OK, but the intention to drink a beer is mediated only by one unique state of the brain (or a portion of the brain). Or are we applying the concept incorrectly. Is the function intentionality or intent to do a particular thing? If it is intentionality with any action as the object, then there might be multiple brain states that exhibit functionality, just as one can have multiple objects functioning as a valve-lifter or a paper weight. The brain functions in other mental states as well, so the brain might also function as a joy creator in the sense I am talking about now, with “joy about” as the function. If the valve lifter is an apt analogy, then intentionality is an analog of a valve-lifter, a component of the overall object that is the brain powering human behavior.

Somewhere however, this has to break down. The more specific a function is stated, the more restricted is fitness to perform the function to the point that some functions may be constrained to being mediated by only one unique structure.

The concept of function does not include aboutness, i.e., intention to do something contains aboutness, but being a valve lifter doesn’t. Joy includes aboutness. In general so-called mental states include aboutness. But, if the concept of function does not include aboutness, then these states cannot be described by functionalism.

Painting the bathroom is a function, in that it has a causal role of uniting paint with bathroom walls. A robot could do the job, in principle, or a chimpanzee. It does not require a human, and anything that can paint the bathroom can also do something else, e.g., reprogram the robot to rake leaves or paint another room. So maybe the question is, do mental states occupy a functional role? If so it cannot include the aboutness. Thus I argue that intention can be covered by functionalism, but not a specific intention. Painting the bathroom has the function painting, which can be used besides in the bathroom, but yet painting can be used for any activity that has a similar process, substituting the material being applied to a surface.

Functionalism has to do with meaning of being. Looked at this way, the intrinsic nature is immaterial. But it also becomes restricted to having to explain all meaning in terms of function. Artifacts are easy to explain in these terms, since they were created for a function, they therefore fit into a causal role. Natural objects create a major problem. Part of it is that they are fairly specifically fitted to their role. But intact beings can be multifunctional, and be described in a limited way by functionalism, e.g. how would I apply it to an animal? OK as an intact being, e.g., predator, scavenger, etc.. Where it seems to break down is in a middle area. However, at the plant level functionalism doesn’t do too badly on the components. I as a painter of a bathroom can have other functions, but below the level of the intact being difficulties set in, as witness trying to use functionalism to describe the mind.

As long as we stay away from mentation we are fine. There would seem to be an inherent problem in that underlying the concept of mind seems to deny a functional description. Is it because mind is immaterial? Or is it simply that the question is formulated incorrectly. My suspicion is that it is the former, that the question cannot be formulated correctly with respect to mind. It is another approach that reveals the problem of dualism.

Today in Drudge I read that "NYT Shows Rumsfeld's Home; Points out Security Camera... ". When I connect to the link, it is in the "ESCAPE" section and recommends "Weekends With the President's Men".

OK, am I cynical or is this another way to undermine the Bush Administration? Disguised as a travel piece is a major breach of the security and privacy of both the Secretary of Defense and the Vice-President. The two people the MSM hates the most after President Bush.

I think we need to publicize where Bill Keller lives, what his phone number is, what his personal email is, or any other item that is "public" knowledge but is assumed private. At this point, I see the only response to such behavior is an equivalent response.